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Empress Casino Joliet v.
Giannoulias :: 2008 :: Supreme Court of Illinois Decisions :: Illinois Case Law :: Illinois Law :: US Law :: Justia Docket Nos.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS EMPRESS CASINO JOLIET CORPORATION et al.
ALEXI GIANNOULIAS, Treasurer of the State of Illinois, et al.
Opinion filed June 5, 2008.
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.
The Act provided that the proceeds of the surcharge were to be distributed to the five horse racing tracks in Illinois.
For the reasons that follow, we hold that Public Act 94 804 withstands the constitutional challenges raised, in the circuit court of Will County, by the four casinos subject to the tax.
There are 10 licenses available for riverboats in Illinois: nine are in use, the tenth is in litigation.
The nine riverboat casinos are located in Alton, Aurora, East Dubuque, East St.
Louis, Elgin, Joliet, Metropolis, Peoria, and Rock Island.
In May 2006, the General Assembly passed Public Act 94 804.
Distribution of the abovedescribed 40% takes place as follows: 11% to Fairmount Park Racetrack and 89% to the other four tracks pro rata based on the aggregate proportion of total handle1 for calendar years 2004 and 2005 from wagering on live races conducted in Illinois.
In enacting Public Act 94 804, the legislature made the following findings: 1 That riverboat gaming has had a negative impact on horse racing.
By requiring that riverboats agree to pay 3% of their gross revenue into the Horse Racing Equity Trust Fund, total purses in the State may increase by 50%, helping Illinois tracks to better compete with those in other states.
Illinois currently ranks thirteenth nationally in terms of its purse size; the change would propel the State to second or third.
Act 94 804, §1, eff.
Giannoulias was substituted as defendant when he took office.
In count II, plaintiffs alleged that the Act violates article VIII, section 1 the so-called public funds clauseof the Illinois Constitution because the surcharge was imposed for a private purpose only.
In count III, plaintiffs alleged that the Act violates the uniformity clause article IX, section 2 of the Illinois Constitution as well as the equal protection clauses of the Illinois and federal constitutions.
Lastly, in count IV, plaintiffs alleged that the Act violates the special legislation provision article IV, section 13 of the Illinois Constitution because the surcharge confers a benefit on a particular private group without a reasonable basis, rather than promoting the general welfare of the state.
Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against the imposition or collection of the surcharge.
Balmoral Park Racing Club, Inc.
The parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, holding that the Act is invalid because it violates the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution.
The circuit court found there was no real and substantial difference between the four casinos taxed and the five casinos not taxed and that no reasonable relationship had been provided for the classification.
The court found that the ability-to-absorb justification was insufficient.
Because the circuit court invalidated an Illinois statute, defendants and intervenors appeal directly to this court.
We review the circuit court s grant of summary judgment de novo.
We also review the constitutionality of a statute de novo.
Statutes bear a presumption of constitutionality, and broad latitude is afforded to legislative classifications for taxing purposes.
The party challenging a nonproperty tax classification carries the burden of rebutting that presumption and clearly establishing the Act s unconstitutionality by showing that it is arbitrary or unreasonable.
We have a duty to uphold a statute as constitutional whenever reasonably possible.
Standards for a Uniformity Challenge Article IX, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution provides: In any law classifying the subjects or objects of non-property taxes or fees, the classes shall be reasonable and the subjects and objects within each class shall be taxed uniformly.
Exemptions, deductions, credits, refunds and other allowances shall be reasonable.
The standards for evaluating a joliet casino empress to a statute based on the uniformity clause click the following article well established: To survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, a nonproperty tax classification must 1 be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and 2 bear some reasonable relationship to the object -5- of the legislation or to public policy.
Relying on language from this court s decision in Arangold Corp.
We rejected both challenges.
With respect to the uniformity challenge, we concluded that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden to show that the asserted justification for the classification was unsupported by the facts.
Plaintiffs maintain that, while the tax was found reasonable in Arangold Corp.
Plaintiffs argue that the critical difference between the instant case and Arangold Corp.
Moreover, plaintiffs contend that whatever harm the casinos have caused to the horse racing industry, it cannot possibly be deemed a burden imposed by the casinos on the state since the state has no responsibility to support the horse racing industry.
Plaintiffs contention that the tax levied against them must be designed to remedy a special burden the casinos imposed on the state in order for the classification to bear a reasonable relationship to the statute is incorrect.
Plaintiffs take comments this court made in Arangold Corp.
From this comment, plaintiffs attempt to engraft onto the second prong of the uniformity analysis a requirement that the tax must be designed to remedy some burden the taxed class has imposed on the state in order to satisfy that prong.
We reject this argument.
When discussing the plaintiffs challenge under the uniformity clause in Arangold Corp.
The language in Arangold Corp.
Rather, it was one factor we considered when, in relation to the plaintiffs due process challenge, we determined whether the statute at issue in Arangold Corp.
Accordingly, we find no support for plaintiffs claims that a tax will violate the source clause unless it is designed to remedy a special burden of the state.
Plaintiffs alternative argument is that the tax at issue here may be upheld only if the casinos stand to benefit from the tax in some special way.
Because it is undisputed the casinos will not benefit from the subsidy, plaintiffs maintain the surcharge is not reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation.
We are unpersuaded by this argument.
We have repeatedly held that a tax may be imposed upon a class even though the class enjoys no benefit from the tax.
Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs attempts to alter the standards for analyzing uniformity clause challenges.
We reiterate: To survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, click to see more nonproperty tax classification must 1 be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and 2 bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.
Rather, joliet casino empress the plaintiff establishes a good-faith uniformity challenge, the taxing body must produce a justification for the classification.
Geja s Cafe v.
It then https://tayorindustry.com/casino/hollywood-casino-kansas-city-photos.html the plaintiff s burden to persuade the court that the justification is insufficient, either as a matter of law or as unsupported by the facts.
Geja s Cafe, 153 Ill.
If the plaintiff cannot do so, then, as a matter of law, judgment is proper for the taxing body.
Geja s Cafe, 153 Ill.
We further explained the nature of the uniformity clause in Arangold Corp.
Department of Revenue, 117 Ill.
The uniformity clause was not designed as a straitjacket for the General Assembly.
Rather, the uniformity clause was designed to enforce minimum standards of reasonableness and fairness as between groups of taxpayers.
Geja s Cafe, 153 Ill.
When a plaintiff challenges a legislative classification, he has the burden of showing the classification is arbitrary or unreasonable.
Geja s Cafe, 153 Ill.
If a set of facts can be reasonably -8- conceived that would sustain it, the classification must be upheld.
Geja s Cafe, 153 Ill.
The question before us is whether these two classifications are arbitrary or unreasonable.
The circuit court found only that the AGR classification violated the uniformity clause.
However, plaintiffs argue to this court that the classification relating to the casinos as a whole is also invalid.
We address this classification first, because if that classification fails, the AGR classification would necessarily fail as well.
Casinos Classification Plaintiffs contend that the Act violates the uniformity clause because the General Assembly s stated reason for singling out casinos for taxation, i.
Defendants and intervenors, however, claim that the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.
They note that the object of the legislation at issue here was to reverse the decline in the horse racing industry.
The legislature s justification for the surcharge, as expressly set forth by the General Assembly in the Act, was that the casinos have had a negative impact on that industry.
Since a justification has been produced, it is incumbent upon plaintiffs to establish that the justification is insufficient as a matter of law or that it is unsupported by the facts.
In their attempt to do so, plaintiffs offer a report entitled A Review of Racing in Illinois with a Comparison to National Trends in Pari-mutuel Wagering, compiled by Eugene Christiansen of Christiansen Capital Advisors, a company that performs studies of the economic, management, operation, taxation and regulation of leisure and entertainment businesses in the United States and abroad.
The report purports to provide trends in Illinois horse race wagering between 1983 and 2004, together with comparison of trends in Illinois horse racing with contemporary trends in horse racing in the United States as a whole; in States with horse racing but no casinos; and in States with horse racing and casinos.
Simulcasting, off-track betting and Internet and other interactive bettor services including telephone account wagering were developments internal to the horseracing industry.
They were not consequences of casino gaming, in Illinois or in the United States.
In the case at bar, the legislature has provided express findings regarding the necessity of the tax imposed on the casinos.
The general rule regarding such findings has been explained: Courts are not empowered to adjudicate the accuracy of legislative findings.
The legislative fact-finding authority is broad and should be accorded great deference by the judiciary.
See Bernier, 113 Ill.
Our task is limited to determining whether the challenged legislation is constitutional, and not whether it is wise.
Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.
Simply because Christiansen s report suggests that casinos are not the sole reason for the decline of horse racing does not mean that plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of establishing that the justification for the classification is arbitrary or unreasonable.
Giving the legislative findings the deference they must be accorded see Best, 179 Ill.
AGR Classification As previously noted, the circuit court in the case at bar held there was no real and substantial difference between the four casinos taxed and the five that were not and, as a result, there was no reasonable relationship between the AGR classification and the object of the Act.
Before this court, plaintiffs ask us to uphold this finding.
Defendants and intervenors maintain that the circuit court s decision must be reversed because plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that this justification for the AGR classification is insufficient as a matter of law or unsupported by the facts.
Initially we note that one reason the circuit court ruled as it did was because it held that the General Assembly did not set forth its justification for the AGR classification within the Act itself.
Defendants and intervenors contend that this was error on the circuit court s part.
Although none of the cases cited by the parties directly analyze this question, it is evident from case law that the legislature is not required to state its justification for a classification within an act.
As this court has stated: The reasons justifying the classification, moreover, need not appear on the face of the statute, and the classification must be upheld if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it.
Department of Revenue v.
We conclude, therefore, -11- that the legislature is not required to provide its justification for a classification within the statute itself.
The circuit court s holding to the contrary was in error.
On a related issue, plaintiffs argue that the ability to absorb justification fails because it is at odds with the expressly stated purpose of the Act, which is to address the harm created by casinos to horse track racing.
Plaintiffs maintain that, when the legislature states its purpose within an act, a classification cannot later be upheld on other grounds.
In support of this argument, plaintiffs rely on Primeco Personal Communications, L.
Illinois Commerce Comm n, 196 Ill.
In Primeco, a municipal infrastructure maintenance fee was imposed by certain municipalities on telecommunications retailers.
The plaintiffs were wireless telecommunications retailers who argued that the fee violated the uniformity clause because the fee was intended as a means of compensating municipalities for the physical occupation of the public right-of-way by telecommunication providers.
Because the plaintiffs, being wireless, did not physically occupy any public right-of-way, they argued that they should not be subject to the fee.
The defendants denied that the fee was a means of compensating municipalities for their occupation of the public right-of-way and instead argued that the fee was a means of raising revenue.
The circuit court found that the object of the fee was to compensate municipalities for use of the right-of-way.
Because the wireless retailers did not use these right-ofways, the court held the classification as applied to plaintiffs was unreasonable.
We affirmed the circuit court and held there was no reasonable relationship between the classification and the object of the legislation.
Plaintiffs maintain that Primeco held that when the General Assembly expressly sets forth the purpose of a tax, the taxing body cannot defend against a uniformity challenge by offering a different rationale.
However, this language appears nowhere in Primeco, nor can it be implied from other language in the opinion.
Primeco simply does not so hold.
We find Primeco distinguishable for another reason.
The defendants in Primeco were attempting to define the purpose of the act itself, not the justification for a classification.
In the case at bar, -12- defendants and intervenors do not assert, as plaintiffs maintain, that the purpose for imposing the surcharge was based on the ability to absorb.
Instead, they assert that the AGR classification is based on the ability to absorb the costs.
Defendants have produced a justification for the classification, i.
It is therefore incumbent upon plaintiffs to show that the justification is insufficient as a matter of law or unsupported by the facts.
Plaintiffs contend that the defendants justification fails because it is not supported by the facts.
Plaintiffs maintain that, if the General Assembly was concerned about a casino s ability to absorb the cost, it would have set the measuring point of the casinos financial condition at the time the surcharge was paid, rather than the 2004 AGR.
We are unpersuaded by plaintiffs arguments.
This is a substantial difference.
Moreover, plaintiffs suggestion that a different method for determining the financial condition of the casinos for deciding whether to impose the surcharge is impractical.
It would be inconceivable to measure the financial condition of the casinos at the time they were required to pay the surcharge.
The Act requires the surcharge to be levied on a daily basis.
It would be logistically impossible to measure the financial condition of each casino every single day.
The legislature had to set some measuring point.
Since the -13- bill was introduced in 2005, the 2004 figures were the most recent financial figures and, thus, a logical choice to use as the measuring point.
The justification itself is the critical focus.
If the justification is reasonable, any further inquiry into the motives of the legislature is improper.
Plaintiffs arguments fail to persuade us that the justification for the AGR classification is not supported by the facts.
Plaintiffs further argue that mere quantitative differences in AGR between otherwise identical businesses should never be enough, alone, to justify an exemption from a fee.
Initially, we do not accept plaintiffs premise that all casinos are identical.
While article source may be true that all casinos might be able to incorporate a surcharge into their services and pass the charge along to customers, this does not mean the casinos are identical.
More fundamentally, however, we agree with defendants that the uniformity clause allows subclassifications and exclusions as long as they are reasonable.
As such, quantitative differences in AGR may be sufficient to justify a classification.
We have previously held that there need not be proof of perfect rationality as to each and every taxpayer.
We conclude that plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating there is no real and substantial difference between the two groups of casinos.
Plaintiffs have not shown the classification is arbitrary or unreasonable.
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court erred in holding that the Act violates the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution.
Public Use and Public Purpose -14- In an alternative argument in support of the circuit court s judgment, plaintiffs claim that the Act is unconstitutional because the subsidy to the horse racing tracks primarily benefits private parties and not the public.
In making this argument, plaintiffs rely on the takings clause of the federal constitution and article VIII, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution.
The federal takings clause provides: nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
This provision is made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment U.
Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v.
National City Environmental, L.
Article I, section 15, of the Illinois Constitution, the Illinois takings clause, provides: Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation as provided by law.
Plaintiffs maintain that the surcharge should be deemed a taking because it will casinos near siesta key florida accept not characterized in the Act as a tax, but a license fee, because it does not have the fundamental characteristic of a tax in that it does not support government or government programs and because it is imposed as a condition of the casinos continuation of a valuable property right their licenses.
Plaintiffs argue that a takings analysis should apply whenever the government takes property, whether real or monetary, from one party and gives it to another and that there is a need for heightened scrutiny to ensure a public purpose is being served.
We reject plaintiffs assertion that a takings analysis applies here.
It is well settled that the takings clauses of the federal and state constitutions apply only to the state s exercise of eminent domain and not to the state s power of taxation.
See County of Mobile v.
The West Virginia Supreme Court has aptly stated this rule: Courts universally have concluded that the takings clauses of the various state and federal constitutions do not apply in the context of taxing statutes, because the power to tax is a separate constitutional power from the power to take property by eminent domain.
Case law from the United States -15- Supreme Court and federal and state courts throughout the country makes clear final, casino rama auditorium capacity words the constitutional takings clause is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon legislatures by their respective constitutions.
Union Pacific Railroad Co.
In re Estate of Lewis, 217 W.
See also Gilman v.
City of Sheboygan, 67 U.
See generally 71 Am.
The same principle applies to fees, whether for certain services or licensing.
V and XIV, sec.
Murphy 1944387 Ill.
Numerous other cases have held the same.
Maverick County, Texas, 389 F.
State, 138 Idaho 348, 63 P.
City of Evansville, 163 Ind.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of Charitable Gaming, 71 S.
Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm n, 223 Minn.
Hennepin County, 124 Minn.
Missouri Gaming Comm n, 13 S.
Ignoring this wealth of law, plaintiffs point to Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass n v.
County of Du Page, 165 Ill.
In Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass n, a fee was imposed in connection with land.
Specifically, a fee was imposed on persons constructing new housing developments to fund road improvements made necessary in light of the expected traffic growth from the development.
Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass n, 165 Ill.
The fee at issue in Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass n was inextricably tied to real property and, thus, a takings analysis was appropriate.
The same is not true here.
The 3% surcharge is in no way tied to real property.
As such, Northern Illinois Home Builders Ass n does not support plaintiffs claim that a takings analysis is applicable here.
Plaintiffs also cite to Eastern Enterprises v.
However, we find plaintiffs reliance on Apfel misplaced.
In Apfel, a plurality of Justices Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O Connor, Scalia and Thomas applied a takings analysis to a monetary obligation, but a majority of the Justices rejected the theory that an obligation to pay money constitutes a taking.
Justice Kennedy, in his separate opinion explained: -17- Our cases do not support the plurality s conclusion that the Coal Act takes property.
The Coal Act imposes a staggering financial https://tayorindustry.com/casino/hollywood-park-casino-table-minimum.html on the petitioner, Eastern Enterprises, but it regulates the former mine owner without regard to property.
It does not operate upon or alter an identified property interest, and it is not applicable to or measured by a property interest.
The Coal Act does not appropriate, transfer, or encumber an estate in land e.
The https://tayorindustry.com/casino/jeux-gratuit-de-casino-lucky-lady-charm.html simply imposes an obligation to perform an act, the payment of benefits.
The statute is indifferent as to how the regulated entity elects to comply or the property it uses to do so.
To the extent it affects property interests, it does so in a manner similar to many laws; but until today, none were thought to constitute takings.
To call this sort of governmental action a taking as a matter of constitutional interpretation is both imprecise and, with all due respect, unwise.
It was noted that: The private property upon which the Clause traditionally has focused is a specific interest in physical or intellectual property.
Observing that application of the Takings Clause here bristles with conceptual difficulties, Justice Breyer noted that the plurality s analysis would seemingly be applicable to ordinary taxes and other -18- statutes and rules that routinely create financial burdens for some that benefit others.
Thus, five Justices of the Supreme Court in Apfel reaffirmed the traditional rule that regulatory actions requiring the payment of money are not takings.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the surcharge at issue here is not subject to a takings challenge.
The Act does not involve an interest in physical or intellectual property, nor does it operate upon or alter an identifiable property interest.
The case at bar does not involve the state s exercise of its eminent domain powers, but rather involves its exercise of its taxing powers.
We conclude that the surcharge is not a taking of private property within the meaning of the constitutional takings clauses.
As such, a takings analysis is not applicable to plaintiffs claim.
We now turn to plaintiffs challenge that the surcharge violates article VIII, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution the public funds clause.
Village of Winnetka, 73 Ill.
In Friends of the Parks, we reiterated the well-settled principles regarding a public purpose: This court has long recognized that what is for the public good and what are public purposes are questions which the legislature must in the first instance decide.
Chicago Park -19- District, 203 Ill.
We have further expressed: What is a public purpose is not a static concept, but is flexible and valuable non smoking casino albuquerque just of expansion to meet the changing conditions of a complex society.
See also People ex rel.
City of Urbana v.
City of Salem v.
In deciding whether a purpose is public or private, courts are largely influenced by the course and usage of the government, the object for which taxes and appropriations have been customarily and by long course of legislation levied and made, and what objects have been considered necessary to the support and for the proper use of the government.
In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill.
See also In re Marriage of Lappe, 176 Ill.
If the purpose sought to be achieved by the legislation is a public one and it contains elements of public benefit, then the question of how much benefit the public derives is for the legislature, not the courts.
Plaintiffs contend that, from the face of the Act, the primary intended beneficiaries are private parties and, joliet casino empress, the Act fails the public-purpose test.
The standards established above require us to defer to the legislative findings announced in the Act unless plaintiffs have made a showing that the findings are evasive and that the purpose of the legislation is principally to benefit private interests.
Plaintiffs have not shown that the legislative findings, as stated in the Act, are evasive or deceptive.
Thus, our inquiry turns on whether the surcharge created by the Act serves a public purpose.
Plaintiffs argue that the primary intended beneficiary of the surcharge are private parties, the track owners, and not the public.
First, plaintiffs maintain that, because all of the proceeds of the surcharge are turned over to the track owners, this demonstrates the intended beneficiary is private.
In a related argument, plaintiffs maintain that, because there is no effective control on how the track owners in grant ok concerts choctaw casino use the 40% of the surcharge given to them, this demonstrates the intended beneficiary was private.
The plain language of the Act belies this argument.
While it may be true the proceeds go directly to the track owners, the manner in which the owners must utilize the funds is controlled by statute.
The track -21- owners cannot simply pocket any of the funds they receive, not even the 40%.
The 40% is earmarked for specific purposes and must be used by the tracks for those purposes.
Plaintiffs also maintain that the benefits are conferred on the tracks without regard to need.
The legislature could reasonably have concluded that the total handle of a track related to how much of a benefit to the economy that track could achieve.
Stated differently, the legislature could have believed that the tracks with the larger handles would be able to gabriel at pala casino 4 2020 more benefit to the industry and economy as a whole and, thus, should be entitled to more support.
Plaintiffs arguments do not support their contention that the Act benefits only private parties.
Certainly, the principal purpose of the Act is a public one: to stimulate economic activity, including the creation and maintenance of jobs and the attraction and retention of sports and entertainment, particularly betting on horse racing.
See Friends of the Parks, 203 Ill.
We conclude that the Act does, in fact, serve a public purpose.
The surcharge will benefit the general well-being of society and the prosperity of the people of the State of Illinois.
See Friends of the Parks, 203 Ill.
City of Urbana, 68 Ill.
The emphasis of the Act is to benefit the entire horse racing industry, not simply the track owners, and the collateral businesses associated with that industry.
The surcharge will serve to reduce the costs of unemployment and the evils attendant thereto should the industry collapse and the 35,000plus associated jobs lost.
See People ex rel.
City of Urbana, 68 Ill.
The ultimate result of the surcharge will encourage an increase in industry in this state, including farming, breeding, and training, will stimulate commercial growth, and will revitalize an economically stagnant industry.
All of these are objects that enhance the public weal.
City of Urbana, 68 Ill.
Illinois has a strong interest in preserving the viability of industries in this state, which in turn will benefit the economy of the state as a whole.
Legislation intended to alleviate these conditions and their inherent problems certainly is in the public interest.
New and expanded industry in communities within the State provides work and opportunities buffalo casino hotel only for those who would be directly employed, but also for others who provide goods and services to those who live and work in the community.
The private benefit resulting from the Act is incidental to the public purpose and benefit to be served, and there is no contravention of the constitution in this regard.
The same joliet casino empress true here.
Because we find that plaintiffs have not shown the legislative findings in the Act are evasive nor have they shown that the purpose of the Act is primarily to benefit private interests, we defer to the legislative findings in the Hard rock casino tampa florida buffet and the legislature s determination that the Act was necessary.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Act does not violate article VIII, section 1.
Retroactivity Plaintiffs raise a cursory argument regarding retroactivity.
Plaintiffs argue that it is impermissible to impose the tax at issue here because it retroactively punishes them for entirely lawful competition.
Citing to Apfel, 524 U.
In Apfel, a majority of the Court struck down, on varying constitutional grounds, an act that required coal mine operators to fund health-care benefits for retired workers.
There, the liability reached back 30 to 50 years Apfel, 524 U.
Moreover, the liability would continue for many years in the future.
Lastly, the liability was unrelated to any injury the defendant had caused.
The case at bar is distinguishable from Apfel.
The surcharge does not reach back in the distant past and is of a very limited duration, i.
Further, while the surcharge might be a temporary financial burden on plaintiffs, it is related to injury the casinos caused to the horse racing industry.
We find no constitutional violation on this ground.
Equal Protection and Special Legislation No arguments have been raised before us in connection with the equal protection and special legislation challenges and, thus, we need not address them.
CONCLUSION The circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.
Public Act 94 804 does not violate the uniformity clause.
Moreover, the Act is not subject to a takings analysis, does not violate the public funds clause of the state constitution, and is not impermissibly retroactive.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

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Hollywood Casino is a stationary boat Casino in Joliet, Illinois and is open daily 7:30am-5:30am.. Empress Casino Joliet (Casino located within the Hotel)


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Casino Camper - Hollywood Casino Joliet Overnight RV Parking Information
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Hollywood Casino Joliet

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Company profile page for Empress Casino Joliet Corp including stock price, company news, press releases, executives, board members, and contact ...


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ROOM TOUR - Harrah's Hotel and Casino, Joliet IL

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JOLIET, Ill. — Officials say thousands of people attended the grand reopening of the Empress Casino in Joliet, which has been closed since.


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Argosy's Empress Casino
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No one under 21 is allowed in the campground!
This information from 2009 so verify if you're traveling with kids.
No one under 21 is allowed in the campground!
This information from 2009 so verify if you're traveling with kids.
Stayed at the Hollywood Joliet RV park in mid October.
We travel with our two dogs and the park had plenty of places for them to run without bothering other RVers.
No full hook ups, electric and water only.
Staff at check in was friendly and welcoming.
Dump is by exit so convenient if only staying joliet casino empress a few days but quite a ways from the rv park.
Liked the layout of the park.
Back in sites seemed like they were spaced farther apart then the pull thru's.
All in all would definitely stay there again.
Poor services, not well kept up.
Park is nothing more than the remains of the workers camp joliet casino empress over from construction of the hotel and casino.
There joliet casino empress no full hookups, no cable and no WiFi.
There's a huge parking lot that trucks are allowed to overnight in but NOT RV"s.
Instead we are relegated to this so-called Resort.
They make a big deal of the free breakfast in the nearby hotel but that's no value unless you're feeding a scout troupe.
About twice what it's worth.
I couldn't believe this was the same place the click at this page rated.
Stayed here in May 2012.
Sites are spacious and have water and electric.
There is an attendant in the office, also one in the adjacent building for checkout.
Dump station conveniently placed.
If you join the Players Club, you get a coupon book with coupons for the buffet, etc.
Not many places to stay in the Chicago area and this is a very good one.
This site is 100% operated by a private individual.
The operation and growth of this website depends on the support of it's users.
Please consider supporting our efforts.
Your assistance will help this website grow and improve!

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Joliet Casino Debuts New Name, New LookIt has almost been two years since a fire destroyed the gaming venue once known as Joliet's Empress Casino but ...


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Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Johnson | Illinois State Bar Association
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Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Johnson | Illinois State Bar Association
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